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Abstract
Previous game-theoretic studies of vaccination behavior typically have often assumed that populations are homogeneously
mixed and that individuals are fully rational. In reality, there is heterogeneity in the number of contacts per individual, and
individuals tend to imitate others who appear to have adopted successful strategies. Here, we use network-based
mathematical models to study the effects of both imitation behavior and contact heterogeneity on vaccination coverage
and disease dynamics. We integrate contact network epidemiological models with a framework for decision-making, within
which individuals make their decisions either based purely on payoff maximization or by imitating the vaccination behavior
of a social contact. Simulations suggest that when the cost of vaccination is high imitation behavior may decrease
vaccination coverage. However, when the cost of vaccination is small relative to that of infection, imitation behavior
increases vaccination coverage, but, surprisingly, also increases the magnitude of epidemics through the clustering of non-
vaccinators within the network. Thus, imitation behavior may impede the eradication of infectious diseases. Calculations
that ignore behavioral clustering caused by imitation may significantly underestimate the levels of vaccination coverage
required to attain herd immunity.
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Introduction
Vaccination is the primary public health measure for preventing
transmission of infectious diseases as well as reducing morbidity and
mortality from infections [1]. An individual’s decision-making with
respect to vaccination may depend on perceived risk of infection,
cost of infection, cost of vaccination, and the vaccinating behaviors
of other individuals [2,3,4]. Game theory has been integrated into
epidemiological models to investigate vaccination behaviors
[5,6,7,8]. Previous game-theoretic studies on vaccination dynamics
typically assume that the population is homogeneously mixed and
fully rational, defined as making decisions that yield the highest
personal utility based on their perceived risks. In reality, there is
individual heterogeneity in the number of contacts [9–22] and
individuals frequently imitate behaviors of their contacts [23,24],
particularly those who appear to have adopted successful strategies
[25,26]. In addition, peer influence is a significant determinant of
vaccine uptake in many populations [27].
An imitation vaccination model was previously developed under
the assumption of a homogeneously mixed population [25,28].
This model predicts that imitation is likely to generate oscillations
in vaccine uptake, and that the oscillations tend to be large when
the perceived risk of vaccination is high [25]. Since this model
assumes that the population is homogeneously mixed, it cannot
capture clustering of vaccination behaviors in a social network.
The clustering of vaccination opinions can exacerbate disease
outbreaks by interfering with herd immunity [29,30,31].
To evaluate the effect of imitation dynamics on vaccination and
disease outbreaks, we develop social network models with imitation
behavior. We consider three different contact network structures, a
contact network based on a prior study of contact patterns within
Vancouver [9], a relative homogeneous network with a Poisson
degree distribution, and a heterogeneous scale free network (with a
power law degree distribution). We assume that a portion of the
population adopts vaccination based on a ‘‘payoff maximization’’
strategy that maximizes their perceived payoff, and the remaining
population imitates the vaccination choices of their neighbors.
For all three networks considered, we find that imitation
behavior increases the equilibrium level of vaccination coverage
when vaccines are inexpensive and decreases vaccination coverage
when vaccines are expensive. However, when imitation increases
vaccination coverage, it simultaneously leads to connected clusters
of unvaccinated individuals, which increase disease prevalence.
The emergence of susceptible clusters and its detrimental
epidemiological effects are most prominent when vaccination
coverage is close to the herd immunity threshold.
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Basic description
We consider a social contact network where individuals can
switch between decisions of vaccinating or not vaccinating. An
individual’s vaccination decision is a function of both the strategies
their neighbors have adopted and the perceived benefits of
vaccination. Individuals know only the vaccination opinions of
immediate neighbors (i.e., whether they are in favor of or opposed
to vaccinating), and update their strategies either by imitating one
of their neighbors (i.e., following their opinion) or by maximizing
their perceived benefits. The fraction of individuals with imitation
behavior is indicated by H, and the remaining individuals (1{H)
follow a payoff maximization strategy. The population opinion
configuration is denoted by V~V X1,X2,   ,XN ðÞ , where Xi
indicates the vaccination opinion of individual i,
Xi~
1i f i is vaccinator
0i f i is nonvaccinator

ð1Þ
Let PX i ðÞ be the perceived payoff of an individual i with opinion
Xi, then
P(Xi~1)~{CV ð2Þ
P(Xi~0)~{CI:li, ð3Þ
where CV is the individual’s cost of vaccinating, CI is the
individual’s cost of infection, and li is perceived probability of
infection. The payoffs are negative because maximizing a payoff in
this context means minimizing a negative health cost/impact. Let
r be the relative cost of vaccination (cost of vaccination/cost of
infection), r~CV=CI. Without loss of generality, we can rewrite
Eqs. 2 and 3 as:
P(Xi~1)~{r ð4Þ
PX i~0 ðÞ ~{li, ð5Þ
Let b be the perceived probability of contracting the disease from
an infectious neighbor at a given time step and Ni
nv be the number
of non-vaccinators in the neighborhood of i, respectively. We
assumed that the perceived probability of infection depends on the
number of non-vaccinator neighbors (whose status as non-
vaccinators is assumed known), with no correlation between
degree and the number of non-vaccinator neighbors. From basic
Author Summary
Both infectious diseases and behavioral traits can spread
via social contacts. Using network-based mathematical
models, our study addresses the interplay between these
two processes, as disease spreads through a population
and individuals copy their social contacts when making
vaccination decisions. Imitation can produce clusters of
non-vaccinating, susceptible individuals that facilitate
relatively large outbreaks of infectious diseases despite
high overall vaccination coverage. This may explain, for
example, recent measles outbreaks observed in many
countries with universal measles vaccination policies.
Given that vaccine decisions are likely to be influenced
by social contacts and that such imitation can have
detrimental epidemiological effects, it is important that
policy makers understand its causes, magnitude and
implications for disease eradication.
Figure 1. Degree distributions. The proportion of the population with each given degree are different for a Poisson network (red histogram),
urban network (blue histogram), and exponentially-scaled power law network (pink histogram).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g001
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li~1{(1{(1{z)b)
Ni
nv, ð6Þ
where f denotes the perceived probability that an unvaccinated
neighbor will not become infected.
‘‘Payoff maximization’’ behavior
A payoff maximizer i will vaccinate if PX i~1 ðÞ wPX i~0 ðÞ and
will not vaccinate if PX i~1 ðÞ vPX i~0 ðÞ . When PX i~1 ðÞ ~
PX i~0 ðÞ , an individual i will adopt the vaccinator or non-
vaccinator strategy with equal probability (50%). If the entire
population adopts payoff maximization strategy, the system is
expected to settle on the Nash equilibrium at steady state.
Imitation vaccination behavior
An imitator i randomly chooses a neighbor (‘role model’) j to
imitate. Imitator i adopts j’s vaccination decision according to
predetermined rules:
(1) If i and j have the same opinion, they will both hold that
opinion.
(2) If i and j have opposite opinions, i will adopt j’s vaccination
decision with probability
W(DPi?j)~
1
1ze
{a:DPi?j
, ð7Þ
where DPi?j is the benefit that i gains by adopting j’s
vaccination decision. If i is a vaccinator and j is a non-
vaccinator, DPi?j~{lizr;i fi is a non-vaccinator and j is a
vaccinator, DPi?j~li{r. If we assume r[ 0,1 ½  , DPi?j[
{1,1 ½  . The parameter a in Eq. 7 determines the individuals’
responsiveness to payoff differences. For low values of a, Eq. 7
changes more gradually as DPi?j goes from negative to
positive, meaning that imitators are less responsive to payoff
Figure 2. Fermi function. Probability that individual i adopts individual j’s vaccination strategy. a represents the degree to which individuals
respond to the differences of payoff.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g002
Table 1. Summary of the parameters used in simulations.
Parameter Description Baseline value
^ b b Transmission probability Calibrated*
f Probability a random contact is not
infected per epidemic
Calibrated**
b Perceived transmission probability ^ b b=(1{f)
a Degree of responsiveness to
differences of payoff
5
g Recovery probability 0.25
N population size (number of nodes) 5000
r Relative cost of vaccination variable of interest
H Fraction of imitators variable of interest
*For each network structure, transmission probability was chosen so as to
ensure that the average final size of the epidemic is approximately equal to 90%
of the total population. For Poisson network ^ b b=0.05, urban network ^ b b=0.06,
and exponential-scaled power law network ^ b b=0.52.
**The perceived probability a random contact is infected per epidemic (1{f)
was chosen to be constant, with value varying between 50–90%. For each value
of f, b was chosen such that (1{f)b~^ b b.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.t001
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vaccination decision of a less successful role model. However,
for high values of a, Eq. 7 changes abruptly at DPi?j =0,
meaning that imitators are highly responsive to payoff
differences (Figure 1). Eq. 7, also known as the Fermi function
[26,31], has been widely used to model strategy changes
induced by imitation behavior [26,31,32].
Contact networks
We compare vaccination dynamics across three different classes
of networks: a pseudo-empirical urban network based on contact
patterns within Vancouver, Canada [9], a homogeneous random
network with a Poisson degree distribution, parameterized so that
the average degree is equal to that of the urban network, and a
highly heterogeneous, power law network in which degrees follow
a truncated power law distribution. Let Pk denote the probability
that a randomly selected individual in a network has degree k. The
Poisson network is given by Pk~(mk=k!)exp({m)with mean
contact number m~17:7; the power law network is given by
Ck{2 exp({k=100) with mean contact number of 4.5 (Figure 2).
We calibrate epidemic parameters to ensure that infection risk in
an unvaccinated population is equal across all network structures
[33,34]. More precisely, we calibrate the value of disease
transmission probability to ensure that the average final epidemic
size is equal across the population structures. We chose the final
size to be equal to 90%, although results were found to be
qualitatively robust for a range of final sizes. For each network, the
population size N was equal to 5000. The contact networks are
generated using the configuration model (CM) algorithm for
constructing finite random networks with a specified degree
sequence [35,36]. We generated degree sequences by choosing
random deviates from these degree distributions.
To investigate the effect of imitation behavior on vaccination
and disease outbreaks, we assumed that the perceived transmission
probability (1{f)b is equal to the transmission probability of the
infectious disease.
Monte Carlo simulations
We perform Monte Carlo simulations on vaccinating opinion
formation and disease transmission according to these four steps:
(i) Generate the contact network
(ii) Randomly sample H=N individuals from the entire
population N and assume they are imitators. Imitators will
update their vaccination decisions according to the
imitation model. The rest of the population updates their
decisions so as to maximize their perceived benefits of
vaccination. We vary H from 0 to 1.
(iii) Randomlyassigneachindividualavaccinationdecision(i.e.,
vaccinate or not vaccinate) such that the initial vaccination
coverage is between 0% and 100%, and then run the model,
using a parallel update rule, until a steady state is reached.
The steady state is reached when the difference in mean
vaccination coverage over three consecutive time windows
(N steps) is sufficiently small (,0.005). Each individual gets
vaccinated according to its vaccination strategy. Vaccinated
individuals are immune to infection.
Figure 3. Vaccination coverage as a function of the relative cost of vaccination (r) and the fraction of imitators (H) in a (A)
homogenous Poisson network, (B) urban network, and (C) exponentially-scaled power law network. Parameters: Population size
N=5000, recovery rate g=0.25 d
21, a=5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g003
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epidemic model on the network generated in step (i) withthe
final vaccination decisions reached in step (iii). The infection
is introduced by inoculating 10 randomly chosen susceptible
individuals to minimize stochastic fadeout. At each time
step, each susceptible individual i is infected with probability
1{(1{^ b b)
Ni
inf, where ^ b b is the transmission probability of the
infectious disease and Ni
inf is the number of infected
neighbors of individual i. An infected individual recovers
and becomes immune with probability g per time step. We
run the model until no infection exists in the system.
(v) In our analyses, baseline parameter values (Table 1) are
used unless stated otherwise. We vary the relative cost of
vaccination from 0 to 1. The equilibrium results represent
the averages over 100 iterations of step (iv) in 100
independent simulations (step (ii)–(iv)).
Results
Equilibrium vaccination coverage
We found that imitation (H) tends to increase vaccination
coverage when the cost of vaccination (r) is low and to decrease
vaccination coverage when r is high (Figure 3). However, the effect
of imitation varies with the degree of distribution of the contact
network (Figure 3). Comparing two extreme cases of H (H~0:
fully payoff maximization and H~1: fully imitation), imitation
dynamics (H~1) can promote near-universal coverage when the
cost of vaccination is very low compared to that of infection (small
values of r) (Figure 3). This difference is particularly pronounced in
the power law network.
Individuals have a high incentive to vaccinate when the relative
cost of vaccination (r) is low, and not to vaccinate when it is high.
Moreover, when most of an individual’s neighbors adopt a given
Figure 4. Frequency of vaccination as a function of the number of neighbors an individual has for the two extreme cases: fully
payoff maximization (H=0) and fully imitation (H=1). The homogeneous Poisson network is represented by (A,D), the urban network by
(B,E), and the exponential-scaled power law network by (C,F). (A–C) the relative cost of vaccination r=0.1; (D–E) r=0.7. The solid line represents the
average degree of the network, and the dashed line represents the average excess degree of the network. The average excess degree is a measure of
the tendency to which individuals with high degree are connected to individuals with low degree, and vice versa [11].
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g004
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strategy. That is, if an individual is surrounded by vaccinators,
their risk of infection and resulting incentive to vaccinate will both
be low; if an individual is surrounded by non-vaccinators, their risk
of infection and incentive to vaccinate will be high. However,
imitators have a non-zero probability of copying the vaccination
strategy that is adopted by most of their neighbors, even when
such a strategy may be less suboptimal for them. For low values of
r, payoff maximizers have a high incentive to vaccinate, and thus
imitators are likely to have vaccinators as role models; the opposite
should be true under high values of r. Therefore, for low values of
r, imitators may have higher vaccination coverage than payoff
maximizers, whereas for high values of r, imitation may lead to
fewer vaccinators than anticipated by payoff maximization
strategy (Figures 3 and 4).
The power law network was shown to be more sensitive to the
effect of imitation behavior than Poisson and Urban networks
(Figures 3 and 4). This is due to the fact that the power law
network has a highly skewed degree distribution, with a small
density of highly-connected individuals. Highly-connected indi-
viduals (hubs) have a high incentive to vaccinate, whereas
individuals with few contacts have less incentive to vaccinate. By
imitating their highly-connected neighbors, individuals with few
contacts become more likely to vaccinate, which may substantially
increase vaccination coverage (Figures 3 and 5). However, this
increase of vaccination coverage overall decreases the incentive for
hubs to vaccinate (Figure 5). Depending on the density of hubs and
the value of the relative cost of vaccination, this decrease in the
incentive of hubs to vaccinate may reduce the total vaccination
coverage within the population (Figure 3).
Final size of outbreak
We found that imitation (H) increases the final size of the
outbreak (i.e., the fraction of the population infected) for
intermediate costs of vaccination (r) (Figure 6). Numerical
investigation showed that this range of values, which varies with
Figure 5. Vaccination coverage of imitators and payoff maximizers as a function of the relative cost of vaccination (r) for the
portion of imitators equals to H=0.2, H=0.5, H=0.8. The homogeneous Poisson network is represented by (A,B,C), the urban network by
(D,E,F), and the exponential-scaled power law network by (G,H,I).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g005
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the value of r above which it is disadvantageous for anyone to
vaccinate, resulting in a full blown epidemic, and a lower bound
which represents the value of r below which the average final
epidemic size was less than twice the size of the initial inoculum of
10 infected individuals. Imitation dynamics can increase the
vaccination coverage relative to a population with payoff
maximization strategy, when the cost of vaccination is low, but
can never decrease the final epidemic size (Figures 3 and 6). As a
result of behavioral clustering that emerges from imitation
dynamics, the size of the epidemic does not necessarily decrease
as vaccination coverage increases. That is, vaccinators tend to
contact vaccinators, and non-vaccinators tend to contact non-
vaccinators (Figure 7). Because herd immunity is considerably high
in these pockets of vaccinators, further vaccination within these
pockets reduces transmission to a lesser degree than if vaccination
were increased in regions of the network with relatively low
vaccination coverage. The clusters of non-vaccinators fuel
transmission and increase the probability of an outbreak. This
effect of imitation is most prominent when vaccination coverage is
close to the herd immunity threshold (Figures 3 and 6).
Sensitivity analysis for the responsiveness to differences
of payoff
To investigate the sensitivity of our results to the degree to
which imitators respond to payoff differences between themselves
and their neighbors, we compared weak responsiveness to strong
responsiveness (Figure 2). For strong responsiveness, individuals
reliably copy the strategy of successful neighbors. However, if most
neighbors of an imitator adopt a given strategy, then the opposite
strategy becomes advantageous, and the imitator would be more
likely to choose the opposite strategy. Strong responsiveness,
relative to weak responsiveness, leads imitators to rarely copy
unsuccessful neighbors (Figure 2). Therefore, as the degree of
responsiveness increases (a=15), vaccination coverage under pure
imitation (H~1) tends to converge towards the vaccination level
predicted by the payoff maximization equilibrium (Figures 3 and
8). A similar convergence occurs for final epidemic size (result not
shown here).
Discussion
Classic economic theory has not considered the reality that
individuals frequently imitate others [2,3,24,31,37]. Imitation
begins with simple behaviors in infancy and evolves into more
complex behaviors in childhood and adulthood [31,37]. In the
context of epidemiology, imitation behavior can influence
vaccination patterns and thus the dynamics of disease outbreaks
[2,3,24]. In this work, we address the impact of imitation on
vaccination coverage, disease prevalence, and the herd immunity
threshold. We develop a model that allows contact patterns to be
heterogeneous and individuals to incorporate varying degrees of
imitation into decision-making. Individuals within a social contact
network can switch between the strategies of vaccinating and not
vaccinating. An individual’s decision regarding whether to
vaccinate is affected by the strategies that their neighbors have
adopted or the perceived net benefits of vaccination. Monte Carlo
simulations show that imitation dynamics increase the equilibrium
vaccination coverage when vaccination cost is relatively low and
may decrease vaccination coverage when vaccination is costly. In
both cases, imitation actually exacerbates disease transmission
Figure 6. Epidemic size as a function of the relative cost of vaccination (r) and the fraction of imitators (H) in a (A) homogenous
Poisson network, (B) urban network, and (C) exponentially-scaled power law network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g006
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vaccination (r) in a (A) homogenous Poisson network, (B) urban network, and (C) exponentially-scaled power law network.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g007
Figure 8. Vaccination coverage under strong responsiveness to differences of payoff (a=15) in a (A) homogenous Poisson network,
(B) urban network, and (C) exponentially-scaled power law network. Vaccine coverage is given as a function of r for the two extreme cases:
fully payoff maximization (H=0) and fully imitation (H=1). Parameters are identical to Table 1, except a=15.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002469.g008
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non-vaccinators. The detrimental effects of imitation are most
prominent when the vaccination is close to the herd immunity
threshold.
Salathe and Bonhoeffer recently developed a vaccination
opinion formation model to reveal that opinion clustering
increases the size of an epidemic [29]. Their model assumed that
opinions are determined by the proportion of neighbors that have
the same opinion about vaccination, such that whenever an
individual switches opinion, another individual has to switch the
opinion in an opposite way in order to maintain constant
vaccination coverage level [29]. Extending this previous seminal
model, we consider both imitation (opinion formation) and payoff
maximization consideration (individuals are not just blindly
imitating neighbors; they are trying to optimize a payoff function).
Our model thereby recognizes that vaccine decision-making is not
a purely imitative process, and often depends on actual health
considerations. Additionally, by incorporating payoffs, we are able
to analyze the impact of vaccine cost on the dynamics of
vaccination.
This analysis takes an initial step towards understanding the
combined impacts of payoff maximization and imitative decision-
making on vaccination coverage and epidemiological dynamics.
The model, however, rests on several simplifying assumptions. For
example, the contact networks are assumed to remain static
throughout the epidemic, and to be identical for both disease and
behavioral transmission. These assumptions could be relaxed by
incorporating temporal changes in network structure [38], and
modeling multiple different edge types (e.g. individual variation in
susceptibility and infectivity) [39]. The model can also be extended
to allow individuals to follow mixed vaccination strategies, or by
incorporating the effects of past epidemics on vaccine decision-
making [40].
We find that imitation leads to clustering of susceptible
individuals, which may exacerbate outbreaks of infectious diseases.
For example, imitation may explain how outbreaks of measles
have occurred in countries with high overall vaccination coverage
[26,29,41,42]. Given that vaccine decisions are likely to be
influenced by social contacts [29,32,41] and that such imitation
can have detrimental epidemiological effects [29], it is important
that policy makers understand its causes, magnitude, and
implications for disease elimination.
Our findings indicate that the common assumptions of simple
payoff maximization and homogeneous mixing can lead to
misestimates of the level of vaccination coverage necessary to
control a disease outbreak. Our model provides a general
framework for investigating the effect of imitation on vaccination
decision-making and disease outbreaks. The model can be applied
to study the interactions between behavior, public health, and
epidemic dynamics for specific infectious diseases. Data describing
real world imitation behavior in vaccination decision-making will
be critical to future public health applications of the model.
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